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It is difficult to classify the philosophical works of Iris Murdoch (1919-1999). 
Many labels have been attached to her, such as ‘moral realist’, ‘moral cognitivist’, 
‘virtue theorist’, ‘promoter of a narrative approach to ethics’ and so on; all of 
them grasp something of her philosophy, but still none of them is really adequate, 
insofar as each of them is too narrow or somehow misleading. In short, no label 
succeeds in revealing the secret of such an intense and unique research. 
Obviously, it is useful to classify someone’s thought by identifying the 
problems it addresses, the key concepts it develops and makes use of and the 
traditions operating as its fundamental sources. We could say that this is a 
necessary condition for that thought to enrich and nourish other researches. From 
this point of view, Murdoch’s singularity can be a limit, a flaw. But the act of 
labelling, on the other hand, has also a more obscure function; namely, that of 
removing what is singular, keeping at bay the anxiety it provokes. 
When we make a singular philosophical research merely a variation of a 
standard position we are trying to keep that singularity away. Instead of finding 
and discovering a way to deal with it, we make use of one of the procedures 
already at our disposal. Dealing with what is singular without ‘regimenting’ its 
singularity is something much more complex and demanding. According to Iris 
Murdoch, it is the difficult outcome of the path towards virtue. It is the gift of 
virtue.  
While reflecting seriously on the possibility of encountering and dealing with 
what is singular, it is quite likely that we become anxious: in that encounter it 
could become necessary for us to transform ourselves, and the very idea of 
changing in order to better embrace the other can generate distress and anxiety. 
Human beings – and philosophers make no exception – often prefer to give away a 
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great deal of themselves and of their desire just to remain in the repetition of the 
identical, that is, in what Murdoch calls the “machine”.1 
This repetition, indeed, despite the dissatisfaction and the delusion it entails, 
is nevertheless reassuring, since what happens within it, whether good or bad, is 
always the same. Labelling things is just one of the several ways by which we 
make sure, consciously or not, to deal always with variations of the identical. As 
we have told before, this ritual has a particularly respectable status within 
philosophy, but it is also a ritual which prevents us from encountering Iris 
Murdoch’s thought. 
That philosophy had absorbed procedures and protocols which prevented it 
from encountering the elusive obscure and mysterious aspects of life, is something 
Murdoch very soon understood and openly condemned quite often: 
As philosophy is steadily drawn in the direction of logic and becomes 
increasingly a matter for highly trained experts, it separates itself from, and 
discourages, the vaguer and more generally comprehensible theorizing which 
it used to nourish and be nourished by; and the serious student who is either 
studying philosophy or is influenced by it (and there are many of the latter) 
develops an almost excessive fear of imprecision. ‘Everything that can be said 
can be said clearly’. Outside the small area of possible clarity lies the 
dangerous region of ‘mushy’ thinking from which attention is averted. The 
ideal is a demonstration, however tiny, which is clean, sterile and conclusive.2 
This process can be explained in several ways. Most explanations see the 
turning of the search for precise and sharp distinctions into the self-referential 
practice of solving abstruse puzzles as a kind of heterogony of ends: the process 
conducts to an end which is different from, if not completely opposed to, the one it 
was aiming for. But it can be the case that the achieved end contains something of 
what we were obscurely looking for: staying away from what in life is so 
mysterious to be always “dangerous” as well. Murdoch herself admits that often 
philosophy, far from being the pure activity imagined by many (and by many 
philosophers), is one of the practices by which human beings – without revealing 
it – manage to deal with what frightens them:  
It is frequently difficult in philosophy to tell whether one is saying something 
reasonably public and objective, or whether one is merely erecting a barrier, 
special to one’s own temperament, against one’s own personal fears.3 
                                                 
1 Cfr. I. MURDOCH, The Sovereignity of Good over Other Concepts, in: EAD., Existentialists and 
Mystics. Writings on Philosophy and Literature, edited by P. Conradi, Penguin Books, New York 
1999, p. 364. 
2 MURDOCH, A House of Theory, in: EAD., Existentialists and Mystics, pp. 174-175 (Our italics). 
3 MURDOCH, On ‘God’ and ‘Good’, in: EAD., Existentialists and Mystics, p. 359. 
Guest Editors’ Preface 
 
 
217 
 
A theoretical puzzle can be difficult, but it can never bedangerous, since all the 
ways to deal with it, putting it aside included, are well known from the beginning. 
This is not the case with the other’s otherness, that is with the evidence that 
something real and other than us exists. This is why Murdoch claims that 
understanding otherness is the essence of love4, and that love, when so understood, 
“is practically identical with goodness”.5 
What we want to stress here is that if love is needed to acknowledge the 
other’s reality, a ‘loving gaze’ is also needed to encounter and appreciate Iris 
Murdoch’s philosophical discourse’s singularity. Just as, when we try to 
understand someone we love, we deal with him/her without taking our 
frameworks for granted, but willing to open to the new, the same happens with 
Murdoch’s works: we must immerse ourselves in them without haste to forcing 
their meaning into a formula. Her works offer us a chance to re-define what we 
are, primarily but not only, as philosophers.  
What about critical sense? What happens to it when we are involved in a 
loving reading? This is a legitimate question. In Murdoch’s writings, however, we 
find a copious use of critical reason, but it is used in a special way. That is, critical 
reason does not serve the purpose of disguising a duel against a specular image of 
oneself. We think that Murdoch would have endorsed Robert Nozick’s 
unforgettable words, namely those condemning the practice of philosophy as a 
duel.6 
Nevertheless, Murdoch’s critical observations represent attempts to open a 
passage in the other thinkers’ discourse – such as Richard Hare, Jean-Paul Sartre 
or, later, Jacques Derrida – through which it can be thinkable what in those 
discourses has become unutterable and unthinkable. ‘Critical sense’, therefore, 
finds its place not as a distinctive position to be promoted in the debate, but as 
the attention which prevents us from transforming the loving reading into 
connivance with the author, so to ensure that it continues to measure itself with 
the truth of experience. If we don’t want to miss the encounter with Iris Murdoch, 
therefore, we have to involve ourselves in a loving listening, and we also need to 
philosophize with her. 
Shouldn’t this attitude characterize the approach to any philosophical 
thought? The answer is probably yes, but let us concentrate on the present 
moment without dissolving its singularity in the sea of the possibilities and 
virtualities. Now it’s Iris Murdoch’s moment. This “now” does not refer only to 
the hic et nunc of the present issue of Ethics & Politics – the first not devoted to a 
philosophical question but to a philosopher (Iris Murdoch: the Reality of Moral 
Life). It refers also to a more general situation, namely the increasing interest and 
                                                 
4 Cfr. MURDOCH, The Sublime and the Good, in: EAD., Existentialists and Mystics, p. 215. 
5 MURDOCH, The Sovereignity of Good over Other Concepts, p. 375. 
6 Cfr. R. NOZICK, Philosophical explanations, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981, pp. 1-8. 
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attention to this thinker, both abroad, where the number of monographs devoted 
to her thought keeps increasing more and more, and in Italy. As regards Italy, let 
us mention only two examples of this phenomenon: the International Conference 
on Iris Murdoch organized by Ester Monteleone at Roma Tre University in 
February 2014, with the participation of scholars coming from all over the world, 
and the editorial project carried on by the publisher Il Saggiatore, aiming at 
restarting to publish Iris Murdoch’s works. The first steps on this way have been 
the publication of The Flight from the Enchanter (L’incantatore), which was still 
unpublished in Italy, and the reprint of Existentialists and Mystics. Writings on 
Philosophy and Literature. In this ‘Murdochian moment’ we participate as well, by 
collecting the following essays, all written for this occasion (except for two, which 
were nevertheless unpublished in Italy) by scholars capable of a loving listening of 
Murdoch’s words and of ability and willingness to philosophize with her.  
One of the recurring issues of the papers here collected is that of Murdoch’s 
‘realism’, either as the main focus of the essay or as emerging from the 
background of the other questions at stake. This fact is not surprising, given 
Murdoch’s insistence on the centrality of reality in moral life, but also given the 
present philosophical temper which, according to the newspapers, is characterized 
by the shift from the much celebrated “hermeneutic koiné” to a new “realistic 
koiné”. Although these formulas belong more to the politics of philosophy than to 
philosophy in itself, they also indicate a question, strictly bond to the idea of 
reality, philosophy has to deal with. Iris Murdoch can help us dealing with it in a 
non-schematic way and avoiding to seize it as an opportunity to raise barriers 
against our unconscious fears. As we have told, for Murdoch one cannot 
understand moral life without considering the reference to reality: it is false to say 
that all of the moral life depends on the will, while only science deals with reality. 
On the contrary, moral life is the most radical and comprehensive form of contact 
with reality. Within its field no preliminary methodological decision delimitates 
what counts as real, and therefore also imagination can operate as an authentic 
modality to access reality. We can see therefore how Murdoch’s discourse escapes 
simplified partitions, such as that of imagination and reality. And it also escapes 
the abstract opposition between reality and words, since it states that “Words 
constitute the ultimate texture and stuff of our moral being”.7 The reality every 
human being as a moral agent deals with is obviously something common, but 
still there are no neutral and commonly acknowledged epistemic procedures to 
verify it.  
Discovering reality becomes itself a moral achievement. Again, Murdoch 
prevents us from taking refuge in simplified images, like that according to which 
verifying the facts is only a preliminary step of the moral reasoning, a step we are 
all naturally and easily capable of accomplishing.  
                                                 
7 MURDOCH, Salvation by Words, in: EAD., Existentialists and Mystics, p. 241. 
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The following papers offer us different perspectives on Murdochian 
understanding of the reality of moral life, and on the reality of moral life itself. 
But their difference, their divergent accord, far from being a limit, is the best proof 
that the complexity of moral life, at once disturbing and fertile, has been at least 
touched upon. 
 
